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We present a theory of choice among lotteries in which the decision maker's attention is drawn to (precisely
defined) salient payoffs. This leads the decision maker to a context-dependent representation of lotteries
in which true probabilities are replaced by decision weights distorted in favor of salient payoffs. By
endogenizing decision weights as a function of payoffs, our model provides a novel and unified account
of many empirical phenomena, including frequent risk-seeking behavior, invariance failures such as
the Allais paradox, and preference reversals. It also yields new predictions, including some that distinguish
it from Prospect Theory, which we test. We also use the model to modify the standard asset pricing
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Over the last several decades, social scientists have identied a range of important violations
of Expected Utility Theory, the standard theory of choice under risk. Perhaps at the most
basic level, in both experimental situations and everyday life, people frequently exhibit
both risk loving and risk averse behavior, depending on the situation. As rst stressed
by Friedman and Savage (1948), people participate in unfair gambles, pick highly risky
occupations (including entrepreneurship) over safer ones, and invest without diversication
in individual risky stocks, while simultaneously buying insurance. Attitudes towards risk are
unstable in this very basic sense.
This systematic instability underlies several paradoxes of choice under risk. As shown
by Allais (1953), people switch from risk loving to risk averse choices among two lotteries
after a common consequence is added to both, in contradiction to the independence axiom
of Expected Utility Theory. Another form of instability is preference reversals (Lichtenstein
and Slovic, 1971): in comparing two lotteries with a similar expected value, experimental
subjects choose the safer lottery but are willing to pay more for the riskier one. Camerer
(1995) reviews numerous attempts to amend the axioms of Expected Utility Theory to deal
with these ndings, but these attempts have not been conclusive.
We propose a new psychologically founded model of choice under risk, which naturally
exhibits the systematic instability of risk preferences and accounts for the puzzles. In this
model, risk attitudes are driven by the salience of dierent lottery payos. Psychologists
view salience detection as a key attentional mechanism enabling humans to focus their lim-
ited cognitive resources on a relevant subset of the available sensory data. As Taylor and
Thompson (1982) put it: \Salience refers to the phenomenon that when one's attention is dif-
ferentially directed to one portion of the environment rather than to others, the information
contained in that portion will receive disproportionate weighting in subsequent judgments."
In line with this idea, in our model the decision maker focuses on salient payos. He is then
risk seeking when a lottery's upside is salient and risk averse when its downside is salient.
To formalize this idea in a choice between lotteries, we dene a state of the world to be
salient for a given lottery if, roughly speaking, the distance between that lottery's payosand the payos of other available lotteries is large. We thus follow Kahneman (2003), who
writes that \changes and dierences are more accessible to a decision maker than absolute
values". The model then describes how decision makers replace the objective probabilities
they face with decision weights that increase in the salience of payos. Through this process,
the decision maker develops a context-dependent representation of each lottery. Aside from
replacing objective probabilities with decision weights, the agent's utility is standard.1
At a broad level, our approach is similar to that pursued by Gennaioli and Shleifer (2010)
in their study of the representativeness heuristic in probability judgments. The idea of both
studies is that decision makers do not take into account fully all the information available
to them, but rather over-emphasize the information their minds focus on.2 Gennaioli and
Shleifer (2010) call such decision makers local thinkers, because they neglect potentially
important but unrepresentative data. Here, analogously, in evaluating lotteries, decision
makers overweight states that draw their attention and neglect states that do not. We
continue to refer to such decision makers as local thinkers. In both models, the limiting case
in which all information is processed correctly is the standard economic agent.
Our model leads to an understanding of what encourages and discourages risk seeking,
but also to an explanation of the Allais paradoxes. The strongest departures from Expected
Utility Theory in our model occur in the presence of extreme payos, particularly when
these occur with a low probability. Due to this property, our model predicts that subjects in
the Allais experiments are risk loving when the common consequence is small and attention
is drawn to the highest lottery payos, and risk averse when the common consequence is
large and attention is drawn to the lowest payos. We explore the model's predictions
by describing, and then experimentally testing, how Allais paradoxes can be turned on
and o. We also show that preference reversals can be seen as a consequence of lottery
evaluation in dierent contexts (that aect salience), rather than the result of a fundamental
dierence between pricing and choosing. The model thus provides a unied explanation of
risk preferences and invariance violations based on a psychologically motivated mechanism
1In most of the paper, we assume a linear utility function. However, this functional form does not deal
with the phenomenon of loss aversion, i.e. the extreme risk aversion with respect to small positive expected
value bets. To deal with this phenomenon, we modify preferences around zero along the lines of Kahneman
and Tversky (1979) in Section 7.3.
2Other models in the same spirit are Mullainathan (2002), Schwartzstein (2009) and Gabaix (2011).
2of salience.
It is useful to compare our model to the gold standard of existing theories of choice under
risk, Kahneman and Tversky's (KT, 1979) Prospect Theory. Prospect Theory incorporates
the assumption that the probability weights people use to make choices are dierent from
objective probabilities. But the idea that these weights depend on the actual payos and
their salience is new here. In some situations, our endogenously derived decision weights
look very similar to KT's, but in other situations { for instance when small probabilities
are not attached to salient payos or when lotteries are correlated { they are very dierent.
We conduct multiple experiments, both of simple risk attitudes and of Allais paradoxes
with correlated states, that distinguish our predictions from KT's, and uniformly nd strong
support for our model of probability weighting.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we present an experiment illustrating the
switch from risk averse to risk-loving behavior as lottery payos, and their salience, change.
In Section 3, we present a salience-based model of choice among two lotteries, and show how
changes in the structure of lotteries aect the endogenous decision weights. In Section 4, we
use this model to study risk attitudes, derive from rst principles Prospect Theory's weighting
function for a class of choice problems where it should apply, and provide experimental
evidence for our predictions. In Section 5 we show that our model accounts for Allais
paradoxes and preference reversals. We obtain new predictions concerning these paradoxes,
and test them. In Section 6, we extend the model to choice among many lotteries. We
then introduce salience into a standard asset pricing model, which may shed light on some
empirical puzzles in nance, such as the growth-value anomaly. In Section 7, we address
framing eects, failures of transitivity and mixed lotteries. Section 8 concludes.
2 A Simple Example
We begin by presenting the results of two experiments illustrating two central intuitions be-
hind our model: how the contrast between payos in dierent states makes some states more
salient to the decision maker than others, and how this process shapes risk attitudes. The
procedures for all experiments in the paper are described in the Appendix 2 (Supplementary
3Material). The two experiments are:





$1 with probability 95%
$381 with probability 5%
; L2 = f$20 for sure.





$301 with probability 95%
$681 with probability 5%
; L2 = f$320 for sure.
Three points are noteworthy. First, Experiment 2 simply adds $300 to all the payos in
Experiment 1. Second, in both experiments L1 and L2 have the same expected payos.
Third, in both experiments lottery L1 has the same relatively small (5%) probability of a
high payo, and a high (95%) probability of a $19 loss relative to the sure outcome.
The same 120 subjects participated in the two experiments over the internet. In Exper-
iment 1, 83% of the subjects chose the safe option L2, whereas in Experiment 2, 67% of the
same subjects chose the risky option L1. Thus, there is a statistically signicant switch from
a large majority of risk averse choices to a large majority of risk seeking choices. In fact,
over half the subjects who chose L2 in the rst experiment switched to L1 in the second.
Although in each experiment the two options oer the same expected value, the same
subjects are risk averse in the rst experiment and risk loving in the second. Expected Utility
Theory typically assumes risk aversion, and so would have trouble accounting for Experiment
2. Prospect Theory (both in its standard and cumulative versions) holds that the small 5%
probability of the high outcome is over-weighted by decision makers, creating a force toward
risk loving behavior in both experiments. To account for risk averse behavior in Experiment
1 and risk loving behavior in Experiment 2, Prospect Theory requires a combination of
probability weighting and declining absolute risk aversion in the value function.3
Our explanation of these ndings does not rely on the shape of the value function. It
3This is only true if the reference point of a Prospect Theory agent is the status quo. If instead the
reference point is the sure prospect, then both problems are identical and Prospect Theory cannot account
for the switch from risk aversion in Experiment 1 to risk seeking in Experiment 2.
4goes roughly as follows. In Experiment 1, in the state where the lottery loses relative to the
sure payo, the lottery's payo of $1 feels a lot lower than the sure payo of $20. Because
this downside is more salient than winning $381, the subjects focus on it when making their
decisions. This focus triggers the risk averse choice. In Experiment 2, the lottery's payo
in the bad outcome state, $301, does not appear nearly as bad compared to the sure payo
of $320. The upside of winning $681 is more salient and subjects focus on it when making
their decisions. This focus triggers the risk seeking choice. The analogy here is to sensory
perception: a lottery's salient payos are those which dier most strongly from the payos of
alternative lotteries, and the decision maker's mind focuses on salient payos when making
a choice. We now describe a model that formalizes this intuition.
3 The Model
A choice problem is described by: i) a set of states of the world S, where each state s 2 S
occurs with objective and known probability s such that
P
s2S s = 1, and ii) a choice set
fL1;L2g, where the Li are risky prospects that yield monetary payos xi
s in each state s.
For convenience, we refer to Li as lotteries.4 Here we focus on choice between two lotteries,
leaving the general case of choice among N > 2 lotteries to Section 6.
The agent uses a value function5 v to evaluate lottery payos relative to the reference







4Formally, Li are acts, or random variables, dened over the choice problem's probability space (S;FS;),
where S is assumed to be nite and FS is its canonical -algebra. However, as we will see in Equation (7),
the decision maker's choice depends only on the Li's joint distribution over payos and not on the exact
structure of the state space. Thus we use the term lotteries, in a slight abuse of nomenclature relative to
the usual denition of lotteries as probability distributions over payos.
5Throughout most of the paper, we illustrate the mechanism generating risk preferences in our model by
assuming a linear value function v. In section 7.3, when we focus on mixed lotteries, we consider a piece-wise
linear value function featuring loss aversion, as in Kahneman and Tversky (1979).
6This is a form of narrow framing, also used in Prospect Theory. Koszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) build a
model of reference point formation and use it to explain shifts in risk attitudes in the real world. We instead
study risk attitudes in the lab holding reference points constant. These approaches are complementary, as
one could combine our model of decision weights with Koszegi and Rabin's two part value function.
5The local thinker (LT) departs from Equation (1) by overweighting the lottery's most salient
states in S. Salience distortions work in two steps. First, a salience ranking among the states
in S is established for each lottery Li. Second, based on this salience ranking the probability
s in (1) is replaced by a transformed, lottery specic decision weight i
s. To formally dene
salience, let xs = (xi
s)i=1;2 be the vector listing the lotteries' payos in state s and denote
by x i
s the payo in s of lottery Lj;j 6= i. Let xmin
s ;xmax
s respectively denote the largest and
smallest payos in xs.
Denition 1 The salience of state s for lottery Li, i = 1;2, is a continuous and bounded
function (xi
s;x i
s ) that satises three conditions:
1) Ordering. If for states s,e s 2 S we have that [xmin
s ;xmax
s ] is a subset of [xmin
~ s ;xmax

















2) Diminishing sensitivity. If xj










3) Reection. For any two states s, e s 2 S such that xj
s;x
j


















Section 3.1 discusses the connection between these properties and the cognitive notion of











s j + 
. (2)
According to the ordering property, the salience of a state for Li increases in the distance
between its payo xi
s and the payo x i
s of the alternative lottery. In Equation (2), this is
captured by the numerator jxi
s x i
s j. Diminishing sensitivity implies that salience decreases
as a state's average payo gets farther from zero in either the positive or negative domains,
as captured by the denominator term jx1
sj + jx2
sj in (2). Finally, according to the reection
6property, salience is shaped by the magnitude rather than the sign of payos: a state is
salient not only when the lotteries bring sharply dierent gains, but also when they bring
sharply dierent losses. In (2), reection takes the strong form (xi
s;x i
s ) = ( xi
s; x i
s ).
These three properties are illustrated in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Properties of a salience function, Eq. (2)





s), which is a natural property in the case of two lotteries but which is
dropped in the N > 2 lottery case. The second property of (2) is \convexity": salience falls
at a decreasing rate as payos become larger in absolute value. This latter property limits the
extent of diminishing sensitivity, implying that at large absolute payo values the distance
between payos (the numerator) becomes the principal determinant of salience.7 Our main
results rely only on the properties in Denition 1, but we often use the tractable functional
form (2) to illustrate our model. The example of Section 2 follows from (2) evaluated at
 ' 0. In this example, there are two states of the world: one in which the lottery yields its
upside, the other in which it yields its downside.8 In Experiment 1 the state (1;20) where








 (weakly) decreases as the
magnitude of payos (xi
s;x i
s ) goes up. Parameter  in (2) captures the relative strength of ordering (the
numerator) vs. diminishing sensitivity (the denominator). If  = 0, diminishing sensitivity is strong because
any state with a zero payo has maximal salience: (0;x) = 1 regardless of the value of x. When  > 0,
even a state with a zero payo can be not very salient if x is small.
8In this example, constructing the state space from the alternatives of choice is straightforward. Section
7the lottery yields its downside of $1 is more salient than the state (381;20) where the lottery
yields its upside $381, since (1;20) ' 20 1
21 > (381;20) ' 381 20
401 . However, in Experiment
2, where payos have been shifted up, the lottery's upside $681 is more salient than its
downside $301, (301;320) ' 320 301
621 < (681;320) ' 681 320
1001 .
3.1 Salience, Decision Weights and Risk Attitudes
Given a salience function , for each lottery Li the local thinker ranks the states and distorts
their decision weights as follows:
Denition 2 Given states s;e s 2 S, we say that for lottery Li state s is more salient than ~ s
if (xi
s;x i
s ) > (xi
e s;x
 i
e s ). Let ki
s 2 f1;:::;jSjg be the salience ranking of state s for Li, with
lower ki
s indicating higher salience. States with the same salience obtain the same ranking.
Then, if s is more salient than e s, namely if ki
s < ki
e s, the local thinker transforms the odds














where  2 (0;1]. By normalizing
P
s i








decision weight attached by the local thinker to a generic state s in the evaluation of Li is:

i
s = s  !
i
s: (4)
The agent evaluates a lottery by inating the relative weights attached to the lottery's
most salient states. Parameter  measures the extent to which salience distorts decision
weights, capturing the degree of local thinking. When  = 1, the decision maker is a
standard economic agent: his decision weights coincide with objective probabilities (i.e.,
!i
s = 1). When  < 1, the agent is a local thinker, namely he overweights the most salient
states and underweights the least salient ones. Specically, s is overweighted if and only if it
is more salient than average (!i




r  r). The case where  ! 0 describes
the agent who focuses only on a lottery's most salient payos.
3.2 describes how the state space S is derived in more complex cases.
8As show in Appendix 1, Denition 2 implies that the extent of overweighting also depends
on objective probabilities:
Proposition 1 If the probability of state s is increased by ds = hs, where h is a positive
constant, and the probabilities of other states are reduced while keeping their odds constant,
i.e. de s =   s
















This result states that an increase in a state's probability s reduces the distortion of the
decision weight in that state by driving !i
s closer to 1. That is, low probability states are
subject to the strongest distortions: they are severely over-weighted if salient and severely
under-weighted otherwise. This stands in marked contrast to KT's (1979,1992) assumption
that low probability, high rank payos are always overweighted. In our model, payos are
overweighted if and only if they are salient, regardless of probability. On the other hand, by
Proposition 1 our model also implies that the largest distortions of choice occur when salient
payos are relatively unlikely. This property plays a key role for explaining some important
ndings such as the common ratio Allais Paradox in Section 5.1.

















Thus, Li's evaluation always lies between its highest and lowest payos.
Since salience is dened on the state space S, one may wonder whether splitting states,
or generally considering a dierent state space compatible with the lotteries' payo distribu-
tions, may aect the local thinker's evaluation (6). Denote by Sx the set of states in S where
the lotteries yield the same payo combination x, formally Sxfs 2 S jxs = xg. Clearly,
S = [x2XSx where X denotes the set of distinct payo combinations occurring in S. By
Denition 1, all states s in Sx are equally salient for either lottery, and thus have the same
9value of !i
s, which for simplicity we denote !i
















x denotes Li's payo in x. Equation (7) says that the state space only inuences
evaluation through the total probability of each distinct payo combination x, namely x =
P
s2Sx s. This is because salience (:;) depends on payos, and not on the probabilities of
dierent states. Hence, splitting a given probability x across dierent sets of states does
not aect evaluation (or choice) in our model. There is therefore no loss in generality from
viewing S as the \minimal" state space X identied by the set of distinct payo combinations
that occur with positive probability. In the remainder of the paper, we keep the notation of
Equation (6), with the understanding that S is this \minimal" state space.
In a choice between two lotteries, Equation (6) implies that - due to the symmetry of the
salience function (i.e. k1
s = k2













For  = 1, the agent's decision coincides with that of an Expected Utility maximizer having
the same value function v(:). For  < 1, local thinking favors L1 when it pays more than L2
in the more salient (and thus less discounted) states.
3.2 Discussion of Assumptions and Setup
We now discuss our formalization of salience and of the state space, the key ingredients of
our approach.
Salience and Decision Weights
In human perception, a sensorial stimulus gives rise to a subjective representation whose
intensity increases in the stimulus' magnitude but also depends on context (Kandel et al,
1991). In our model, the strength of the stimulus is the payo dierence among lotteries in
a given state and the salience function (:;:) captures the subjective intensity with which
10this stimulus is perceived. Through diminishing sensitivity and reection, this subjective
intensity decreases with the distance of the state's payos from the status quo of zero, which
is our measure of context. As in Weber's law of diminishing sensitivity, whereby a change
in luminosity is perceived less intensely if it occurs at a higher luminosity level, the local
thinker perceives less intensely payo dierences occurring at high (absolute) payo levels.9
Consistent with psychology of attention, we assume that the agent evaluates options
by focusing on (weighting more) their most salient states. The \local thinking" parameter
1= captures the agent's focus on salient states, proxying for his ability to pay attention
to multiple aspects, cognitive load, or simply intelligence. Our assumption of rank-based
discounting buys us analytical tractability, but our main results also hold if the distortion of





The main restriction embodied in our model is that this function does not depend on a
state's probability. The salience function in Equation (2) provides a tractable benchmark
characterized by only two parameters (;). This allows us to look for ranges of  and  that
are consistent with the observed choice patterns.
The State Space
Salience is a property of states of nature that depends on the lottery payos that occur
in each state, as they are presented to the decision maker. The assumption that payos
(rather than nal wealth states) shape the perception of states is a form of narrow framing,
consistent with the fact that payos are perceived as gains and losses relative to the status
quo, as in Prospect Theory.
In our approach, the state space S and the states' objective probabilities are a given of the
choice problem.10 In the lab, specifying a state space for a choice problem is straightforward
when the feasible payo combinations { and their probabilities { are available, for instance
9Neurobiological evidence connects visual perception to risk taking. McCoy and Platt (2005) show in a
visual gambling task that when monkeys made risky choices neuronal activity increased in an area of the
brain (CGp, the posterior cingulate cortex) linked to visual orienting and reward processing. Crucially, the
activation of CGp was better predicted by the subjective salience of a risky option than by its actual value,
leading the authors to hypothesize that \enhanced neuronal activity associated with risky rewards biases
attention spatially, marking large payos as salient for guiding behavior (p. 1226)."
10In particular, we do not address choice problems where outcome probabilities are ambiguous, such as
the Ellsberg paradox. This is an important direction for future work. Similarly, the salience-based decision
weights are not to be understood as subjective probabilities.
11when lotteries are explicitly described as contingencies based on a randomizing device. For
example, L1  (10;0:5; 5;0:5) and L2  (7;0:5; 9;0:5) give rise to four payo combinations
f(10;7);(10;9);(5;7);(5;9)g if they are played by ipping two separate coins, but only to
two payo combinations if they are contingent on the same coin ip [e.g. f(10;7);(5;9)g]. In
our experiments, we nearly always describe the lotteries' correlation structure by specifying
the state space. However, classic experiments such as the Allais paradoxes provide less
information: they involve a choice between (standard) lotteries, and the state space is not
explicitly described. In this case, we assume that our decision maker takes the lotteries
as independent, which implies that the state space is the product space induced by the
lotteries' marginal distributions over payos.11 The intuition is that salience detects the
starkest (payo) dierences among lotteries unless some of these dierences are explicitly
ruled out.
Our emphasis on the state space as a source of context dependence does not lead to
accurate predictions when lotteries are presented in a way that induces the decision maker to
neglect the state space. For example, suppose that the payos of two lotteries are determined
by the roll of the same dice. One lottery pays 1,2,3,4,5,6, according to the dice's face; the
other lottery pays 2,3,4,5,6,1. The state in which the rst lottery pays 6 and the second
pays 1 may appear most salient to the decision maker, leading him to prefer the rst lottery.
But of course, a moment's thought would lead him to realize that the lotteries are just
rearrangements of each other, and recognize them as identical. In the following, we assume
that, before evaluating lotteries, the decision maker edits the choice set by discarding lotteries
that are mere permutations of other lotteries. We also assume (see Section 6) that he discards
dominated lotteries from the choice set. Such editing is plausibly related to salience itself: in
these cases, before comparing payos, what is salient to the decision maker are the properties
of permutation or dominance of certain lotteries. To focus our study on the salience of
lottery payos, we do not formally model this editing process. However, endogenizing the
choice set is an important direction for future work. In a similar spirit, the model could be
generalized to take into account determinants of salience other than payo values, such as
11In Appendix 2 (Supplementary Material) we provide experimental evidence consistent with this assump-
tion, as well as details on the information given in the experimental surveys.
12prior experiences and details of presentation, or even color of font. These may matter in
some situations but are not considered here.
Our theory of decision weights can be viewed as a way to endogeneize the probability
weighting function introduced by Edwards (1962), Fellner (1961) and later used by KT in
Prospect Theory. The various properties of this probability weighting function, such as
overweighting of small probabilities and subadditivity, allow KT to account for risk loving
behavior and the Allais paradoxes. Quiggin's (1982) rank-dependent expected utility and
Tversky and Kahneman's (1992) Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) develop weigthing
functions in which the rank order of a lottery's payos aects probability weighting.12
Our theory exhibits two sharp dierences from these works. First, in our model the
magnitude of payos, not only their rank, determines salience and probability weights: the
lottery upside may still be underweighted if the payo associated with it is not suciently
large. As we show in Section 4, this feature is crucial to explaining shifts in risk attitudes.
Second, and more important, in our model decision weights depend on the choice context,
namely on the available alternatives as they are presented to the agent. In Section 5 we
exploit this feature to shed light on the psychological forces behind the Allais paradoxes and
preference reversals. We are not the rst to propose a model of context dependent choice
among lotteries. Rubinstein (1988), followed by Aizpurua et al (1990) and Leland (1994),
builds a model of similarity-based preferences, in which agents simplify the choice among
two lotteries by pruning the dimension (probability or payo, if any), along which lotteries
are similar. The working and predictions of our model are dierent from Rubinstein's, even
though we share the idea that the common ratio Allais paradox (see Section 5.1.2) is due to
subjects' focus on lottery payos. In Regret Theory (Loomes and Sugden 1982, Bell 1982,
Fishburn 1982), the choice set directly aects the agent's utility via a regret/rejoice term
added to a standard utility function. In our model, instead, context aects decisions by
shaping the salience of payos and decision weights. By adopting a traditional utility the-
ory perspective, Regret Theory cannot capture framing eects and violations of procedural
invariance (Tversky et al. 1990).
12Prelec (1998) axiomatizes a set of theories of choice based on probability weighting, which include CPT.
For a recent attempt to estimate the probability weighting function, see Wu and Gonzalez (1996).
13We now show that our model provides an intuitive explanation for several well known
anomalies of choice under risk and deliver new predictions, which we experimentally test.
Section 6 then shows how our model can be used in relevant economic applications.
4 Salience and Attitudes Towards Risk
Consider the choice between a lottery L1 = (x1
h;h; x1
l;1   h) and a sure prospect L2 =
(x;1) that have the same mean, namely Es(x1
s) = x. Here we assume that all payos are
positive, and leave issues related to loss aversion to Section 7.3. This setup is often used
by experimenters to elicit risk attitudes, and illustrates in the starkest manner how salience
shapes risk attitudes. In state sh = (x1
h;x) the lottery gains relative to the sure prospect,
while in state sl = (x1
l;x) it loses. Since Es(x1
s) = x, it is easy to see that Equation (8)
implies that for any  < 1, a local thinker with linear utility chooses the lottery if and only if
the gain state sh is more salient than the loss state sl, i.e. when (x1
h;x) > (x1
l;x). Indeed,
in this case 1
h > h and the local thinker perceives the expected value of L1 to be above
that of L2, behaving in a risk seeking manner. Using the salience function in Equation (2),





(1   2h) > (x   x
1
l)(1   h), (9)
which uniquely identies the parameter values for which the agent is risk seeking. Holding
the lottery loss (x   x1
l) constant at some value e l (as in the experiments of Section 2, where
e l = 19), the risk attitudes implied by Equation (9) are pictured in Figure 2. Recall that
x > ~ l so that x1
l > 0. For convenience, we set =~ l ' 0.
Two patterns stand out. First, as in Section 2, for a xed h < 1=2, a higher expected
value x fosters risk seeking by inducing a vertical move from the grey to the white region.
When x is low, the lottery's downside x1
l is close to zero. By diminishing sensitivity, the loss
is salient, inducing risk aversion. As x becomes large, the eect of diminishing sensitivity
weakens, due to the convexity of the salience function in (2). Since for h < 1=2 the lottery
gain is larger than the loss, it eventually becomes salient, inducing risk seeking.13
13Besides the properties of Denition 1, to obtain Figure 2 it suces for the salience function to be convex.
Indeed, dene x1
h(h;x) as the upside at which the lottery's expected value is equal to the sure prospect.
14Figure 2: Shifts in risk attitudes
Second, for a given expected value x, a higher probability h of the gain reduces risk
seeking by inducing a horizontal move from the white to the grey region of Figure 2. As h
increases, the lottery's upside must fall for the expected value of L1 to stay constant. As a
consequence, the lottery gain becomes less salient, inducing risk aversion. Risk seeking never
occurs when h  1=2: now the gain is weakly smaller than the loss in absolute terms. By
diminishing sensitivity, the loss is more salient.
Remarkably, in this context our model of decision weights recovers the key features
of Prospect Theory's inverse S-shaped probability weighting function (KT 1979): over-
weighting of low probabilities, and under-weighting of high probabilities. To see how, x
a value of x > e l in Figure 2 and increase the probability h along the horizontal axis. Fig-
ure 3 shows the decision weight 1
h along this path, where 
h(x) is the threshold at which
the agent switches from risk seeking to risk aversion in Figure 2. Low probabilities are
over-weighted because they are associated with salient upsides of longshot lotteries. High
probabilities are under-weighted as they occur in lotteries with a small, non salient, upside.
Note however that in our model the weighting function is context dependent. In contrast
The local thinker is risk seeking if (x1
h(h;x);x) > (x   ~ l;x). Since x1
h(h;x) falls in h, ordering implies
that for h suciently large x   l becomes salient and the agent is risk averse. This is surely the case for
h  1=2. On the other hand, since by convexity (x   ~ l;x) decreases in x, as x becomes large the upside
eventually becomes salient, yielding Figure 2.
15Figure 3: Context dependent probability weighting function
to Prospect Theory, risk seeking behavior is no longer only associated with a low probability
of a gain. At high expected values x, the threshold 
h(x) approaches 1=2 so risk seeking
occurs even at moderate probabilities. At low x the threshold is low, so risk aversion occurs
even at low probabilities. The salience of particular states can induce risk seeking behavior
in conditions that are far more common than those characterizing longshot bets.
We tested the predictions of Figure 2 by giving experimental subjects a series of binary
choices between a mean preserving spread L1 = (x1
h;h; x1
l;1 h) and a sure prospect L2 =
(x;1). We set the downside of L1 at (x x1
l) = $20, yielding an upside (x1
h  x) of $20(1 
h)=h. We varied x in f$20;$100;$400;$2100;$10500g and h in f:01;:05;:2;:33;:4;:5;:67g.
For each of these 35 choice problems, we collected at least 70 responses. On average, each
subject made 5 choices, several of which held either h or x constant. The observed propor-
tion of subjects choosing the lottery for every combination (x;h) is reported in Table I; for
comparison with the predictions of Figure 2, the results are shown in Figure 4.
The patterns are qualitatively consistent with the predictions of Figure 2. For a given
expected value x, the proportion of risk takers falls as h increases; for a given h < 0:5,
the proportion of risk takers increases with the expected value x. The eect is statistically
signicant: at h = 0:05 a large majority of subjects (80%) are risk averse when x = $20, but
as x increases to $2100 a large majority (65%) becomes risk seeking. Finally, there is a large















$10500 0:83 0:65 0:50 0:48 0:46 0:33 0:23
$2100 0:83 0:65 0:48 0:43 0:48 0:38 0:21
$400 0:60 0:58 0:44 0:47 0:33 0:30 0:23
$100 0:58 0:54 0:40 0:32 0:22 0:30 0:13
$20 0:15 0:2 0:12 0:08 0:10 0:25 0:15
0:01 0:05 0:2 0:33 0:4 0:5 0:67
Probability of gain h
Figure 4: Proportion of Risk-Seeking Subjects
drop in risk taking as h crosses 0:5. Note that the increase in x raises the proportion of risk
takers from around 10% to 50% even for moderate probabilities in the range (0:2;0:4). These
patterns are broadly consistent with the predictions of our model. The weighing function of
Prospect Theory and CPT can explain why risk seeking prevails at low h, but not the shift
from risk aversion to risk seeking as x rises. To explain this nding, both theories need a
concave value function characterized by strong diminishing returns.14
In Appendix 2 (Supplementary Material) we show that parameter values   0:7 and
14In Appendix 2 we provide further support for these claims by showing that standard calibrations of
Prospect Theory cannot explain our experimental ndings. For example, the calibration in KT(92) features
the value function v(x) = x0:88, which is insuciently concave. Appendix 2 performs additional experiments
on longshot lotteries whose results are also consistent with out model but inconsistent with Prospect Theory
under standard calibrations of the value function.
17  0:1 are consistent with the above evidence on risk preferences, as well as with risk
preferences concerning longshot lotteries. These values are not a formal calibration, but we
employ them as a useful reference for discussing Allais paradoxes in the next section.
5 Local Thinking and Context Dependence
We now illustrate the distinctive implications of our model regarding the role of context
dependence in the Allais paradoxes and in preference reversals.
5.1 The Allais Paradoxes
5.1.1 The \common consequence " Allais Paradox
The Allais paradoxes (1953) are the best known and most discussed instances of failure of the
independence axiom. Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) version of the \common consequence"
paradox compares the choices:
L
z
1 = (2500; 0:33; 0; 0:01; z; 0:66); L
z
2 = (2400; 0:34; z; 0:66) (10)
for dierent values of the payo z. By the independence axiom, an expected utility maximizer
should not change his choice as the \common consequence" z is varied, for the latter cancels
out in the comparison between Lz
1 and Lz
2.
In reality, experiments reveal that for z = 2400 most subjects are risk averse, preferring
L2400
2 = (2400; 1) to L2400
1 = (2500; 0:33; 0; 0:01; 2400; 0:66). When instead z = 0, most
subjects are risk seeking, preferring L0
1 = (2500; 0:33; 0; 0:67) to L0
2 = (2400; 0:34; 0;0:66).
In violation of the independence axiom, z aects the experimental subjects' choices.
Prospect Theory and CPT (KT 1979 and TK 1992) explain the switch from L2400
2 to L0
1
by the so called \certainty eect", the idea that adding a downside risk to the sure prospect
L2400
2 undermines agents' valuation much more than adding the same downside risk to the
already risky lottery L2400
1 . This eect is directly built into the probability weighting function
(p) by the assumption of subcertainty, e.g. (0:34)   (0) < 1   (0:66).15
15In CPT the mathematical condition on probability weights is slightly dierent but carries the same
18Our model endogenizes this feature of decision weights, and thus explains the Allais
paradox, because the common consequence z alters the salience of lottery outcomes. To
see this, consider the choice between L2400
1 and L2400
2 . The minimal state space is S =
f(2500;2400);(0;2400);(2400;2400)g so there are three states of the world and the most
salient state is one where the risky lottery L2400
1 pays zero because:
(0;2400) > (2500;2400) > (2400;2400). (11)
The inequalities follow from diminishing sensitivity and ordering, respectively, and can be
easily veried for the case of the salience function in Equation (2). By Equation (8), a local
thinker then prefers the riskless lottery L2400
2 provided:
 (0:01)  2400 +   (0:33)  100 < 0, (12)
which holds for  < 0:73. Although the risky lottery L2400
1 has a higher expected value, it is
not chosen when local thinking is suciently severe, because its downside of 0 is very salient.
Consider now the choice between L0
1 and L0
2. Now both options are risky and, as discussed
in Section 3, the local thinker is assumed to see the lotteries as independent. The minimal
state space now has four states of the world, i.e. S = f(2500;2400);(2500;0);(0;2400);(0;0)g,
whose salience ranking is:
(2500;0) > (0;2400) > (2500;2400) > (0;0). (13)
The rst inequality follows from ordering, and the second from diminishing sensitivity. By
Equation (8), a local thinker prefers the risky lottery L0
1 provided:
(0:33)  (0:66)  2500     (0:67)  (0:34)  2400 + 
2  (0:33)  (0:34)  100 > 0 (14)
which holds for   0. Any local thinker with linear utility chooses the risky lottery L0
1
because its upside is very salient.
intuition: the common consequence is more valuable when associated with a sure rather than a risky prospect.
19In sum, when  < 0:73 { which holds in the parameterization  = 0:7,  = 0:1 { a local
thinker exhibits the Allais paradox. It is worth spelling out the exact intuition for this result.
When z = 2400, the lottery L2400
2 is safe, whereas the lottery L2400
1 has a salient downside
of zero. The agent focuses on this downside, leading to risk aversion. When instead z = 0,
the downside payo of the safer lottery L0
2 is also 0. As a result, the lotteries' upsides are
now crucial to determining salience. This induces the agent to overweight the larger upside
of L0
1, triggering risk seeking. The salience of payos endogeneizes the \certainty eect" as
a form of context dependence: when the same downside risk is added to the lotteries, the
sure prospect is particularly hurt because the common downside payo induces the agent to
focus on the larger upside of the risky lottery, leading to risk seeking choices.
This role of context dependence invites the following test. Suppose that subjects are
presented the following correlated version of the lotteries Lz
1 and Lz
2 in Equation (10):
Probability 0:01 0:33 0:66
payo of Lz
1 0 2500 z
payo of Lz
2 2400 2400 z
(15)
where the table species the possible joint payo outcomes of the two lotteries and their
respective probabilities. Correlation changes the state space but not a lottery's distribution
over nal outcomes, so it does not aect choice under either Expected Utility Theory or
Prospect Theory. Critically, this is not true for a local thinker: the context of this correlated
version makes clear that the state in which both lotteries pay z is the least salient one, and
also that it drops from evaluation in Equation (8), so that the value of z should not aect
the choice at all. That is, in our model { but not in Prospect Theory { the Allais paradox
should not occur when Lz
1 and Lz
2 are presented in the correlated form as in (15).
We tested this prediction by presenting experimental subjects correlated formats of lot-
20teries Lz
1 and Lz








The vast majority of subjects do not reverse their preferences (80% of choices lie on the
NW-SE diagonal), and most of them are risk averse, which in our model is also consistent with
the fact that (0;2400) is the most salient state in the correlated choice problem (15). Among
the few subjects reversing their preference, no clear pattern is detectable. This contrasts
with the fact that our experimental subjects exhibit the Allais paradox when lotteries are
presented in an uncorrelated form (see Appendix 2, Supplementary Material). Thus, when
the lotteries pay the common consequence in the same state, choice is invariant to z and
the Allais paradox disappears. Our model accounts for this fact because, as the common
consequence z is made evident by correlation, it becomes non-salient. As a result, subjects
prune it and choose based on the remaining payos.16
This result captures Savage's (1972, pg. 102) argument in defense of the normative char-
acter of the \sure thing principle", and validates his thought experiment. Other experiments
in the literature are consistent with our results. Conlisk (1989) examines a related variation
of the Allais choice problem, in which each alternative is given in compound form involving
two simple lotteries, with one of the simple lotteries yielding the common consequence z.
Birnbaum and Schmidt (2010) present the Allais problem in split form, singling out the
common consequence z in each lottery. In both cases, the Allais resversals subside. See also
Harrison (1994) for related work on the common consequence paradox.
16We tested the robustness of the correlation result by changing the choice problem in several ways: 1) we
framed the correlations verbally (e.g. described how the throw of a common die determined both lotteries'
payos), 2) we repeated the experiment with uncertain real world events, instead of lotteries, and 3) we varied
the ordering of questions, the number of ller questions, and payos. As the Appendix shows, our results
are robust to all these variations. We also ran an experiment where subjects were explicitly presented the
lotteries of Equation (10) with z = 2400 as uncorrelated, with a state space consisting of the four possible
states. The choice pattern exhibited by subjects is: i) very similar to the one exhibited when the state
space is not explicitly presented, validating our basic assumption that an agent assumes the lotteries to be
uncorrelated when this is not specied otherwise, and ii) very dierent from the choice pattern exhibited
under correlation (with 35% of subjects changing their choice as predicted by our model, see Appendix 2).
215.1.2 The \common ratio" Allais Paradox
We now turn to the \common ratio" paradox, which occurs in the choice between lotteries:
L
0
1 = (6000; 
0; 0; 1   
0); L

2 = (  6000; ; 0; 1   ), (16)
where L0
1 is riskier than L
1 in the sense that it pays a larger positive amount ( < 1) with
a smaller probability (0 < ). By the independence axiom, an expected utility maximizer
with utility function v() chooses the safer lottery L
2 over L0
1 when:
v(  6000) 
0








The choice should not vary as long as 0= is kept constant. A stark case arises when
0= = ; now the two lotteries have the same expected value and a risk averse expected
utility maximizer always prefers the safer lottery L
2 to L0
1 for any . Parameter  identies
the \common ratio" between 0 and  at dierent levels of .
It is well known (KT 1979) that, contrary to the Expected Utility Theory, the choices
of experimental subjects depend on the value of : for xed 0= =  = 0:5, when  = 0:9
subjects prefer the safer lottery L0:9
2 = (3000; 0:9; 0; 0:1) to L0:45
1 = (6000; 0:45; 0; 0:55).
When instead  = 0:002, subjects prefer the riskier lottery L0:001
1 = (6000; 0:001; 0; 0:999)
to L0:002
2 = (3000; 0:002; 0; 0:998). This shift towards risk seeking as the probability of
winning falls has provided one of the main justications for the introduction of the probability
weigthing function. In fact, KT (1979) account for this evidence by assuming that this
function grows slower than linearly for small ; hence,  is overweighted relatively to  at
low values of , inducing the choice of L0
1 when  = 0:002.
Consider the choice between L0
1 and L
2 in our model. For  = 1=2 there are four states
of the world, S = f(6000;3000);(0;3000);(6000;0);(0;0)g, and the salience ranking among
them is
(6000;0) > (0;3000) > (6000;3000) > (0;0), (18)
as implied by ordering and diminishing sensitivity. It is convenient to express the agent's
decision as a function of the transformed probabilities of the lottery outcomes (as opposed
22to those of states of the world).17 Denoting these transformed probabilities by b 0 and b ,
we nd that the local thinker evaluates the odds with which the riskier lottery L0
1 pays out








(1   p) + p2
(1   0) + 02. (19)
With a linear utility, the local thinker selects the safer lottery L
2 if and only if ^ 0=^   1=2.
This implies that the local thinker chooses the safer lottery when:
 
2(1   )
2      2. (20)
As in the common ratio eect, the local thinker is risk averse when  is suciently high and
risk seeking otherwise. In particular, for  2 (0:22;1), the local thinker switches from L0:9
2
to L0:01
1 just as experimental subjects do. The parameterization  = 0:7,  = 0:1 is thus
consistent also with the common ratio eect.
The intuition for this result (see Proposition 1) is that salience exerts a particularly
strong eect in low probability states. The upside of the riskier lottery L0
1 is salient at every
, creating a force toward risk seeking. Crucially, however, this force is strong precisely
when  is low. In this case, the greater salience of the risky lottery's upside blurs the small
probability dierence    0 = (1   ) between the two lotteries. When instead  is large,
the agent realizes that the risky lottery is much more likely to pay nothing, inducing him
to attach a large weight on the second most salient state (0;3000). This is what drives the
choice of the safe lottery L0
2 .
Experimental evidence shows that this common ratio eect is also not robust to the
introduction of correlation. KT (1979) asked subjects to choose between two lotteries of the
type (18) in a two-stage game where in the rst stage there is a 75% probability of the game
ending without any winnings and a 25% change of going to stage two. In stage two, the
lottery chosen at the outset is played out. The presence of the rst stage is equivalent to
17From any vector of state-specic decision weights (i
s)s2S, the decision weight i(x) attached to lottery




s where Sxi is the set of states where i pays x.
23reducing by 75% the winning probability for both lotteries, so in terms of nal outcomes this
setting is equivalent to the setting that leads to the common ratio eect above. Crucially,
however, KT document that in this formulation there is no violation of the independence
axiom.
In explaining this behavior, KT informally argue that individuals \edit out" the correlated
rst stage state where both lotteries pay zero. Our model yields this editing as a consequence
of the low salience and cancellation of such state. Adding a correlated state where both
lotteries pay 0 neither aects the salience ranking in Equation (18) nor { more importantly
{ the odds ratios between states. As a result, the local thinker chooses as if he disregards
the correlated state and its probability. This is what experimental subjects do.
In sum, our model explains the Allais paradoxes as the product of a specic form of
context dependence working though the salience of lottery payos. Adding a common payo
to all lotteries changes risk preferences by changing the salience of lotteries' upsides or down-
sides. Rescaling the lotteries' probabilities shapes the importance of salience vs. likelihood
in determining decision weights, which also aects choice. Crucially, the presence of context
dependence implies that risk attitudes depend on how the lotteries are presented. Adding a
common payo or rescaling probabilities by introducing in the lotteries a non-salient corre-
lated state does not aect choice: it is too enticing for subjects to disregard this state and
to abide by the independence axiom.
5.2 Preference Reversals
Context dependence in our model can also explain the phenomenon of preference reversal
described by Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971). They asked subjects to choose between a safer
lottery L, which has a high probability of a low payo, and a riskier lottery L$, which
has a low probability of a high payo (we denote the lotteries using conventional notation).
Subjects may systematically choose the safer lottery L and yet state a higher minimum
selling price for the riskier lottery L$. Preferences as revealed by choice are thus the opposite
of preferences as revealed by pricing. This phenomenon, conrmed also by Grether and Plott
(1979) and Tversky et al. (1990), is at odds with both standard Expected Utility Theory
and Prospect Theory, leading to claims that choosing and pricing follow two fundamentally
24dierent principles.
To study preference reversals in our model, consider how a local thinker prices a lottery.
As in Expected Utility Theory, the minimum selling price is the amount of money at which
the local thinker is indierent between receiving that amount and playing the lottery, namely
the lottery's certainty equivalent. For a local thinker, this price is found by replacing the
lottery's probabilities with decision weights, which in turn depend on the agent's perception
of the choice alternatives. Formally, when choosing between lotteries L1 and L2, a local
thinker with a value function v() prices L1 at:













s is the decision weights of state s for lottery L1 in the context of its choice against
lottery L2. With a linear value function, the price P(L1jL2) is the expected value of L1
as perceived by the local thinker. If the agent is asked to price a lottery in isolation, we
naturally assume that he evaluates it in the context of a choice between the lottery and the
status quo of not having it L0  (0;1), i.e. of getting zero for sure.
Consider now preference reversals in our model. In the experiments, subjects are rst





x; with probability 0





x; with probability 
0; with probability 1   
, (22)
where typically 0= =  = 1=2, as in the common ratio experiments. We know from (20)
that, with linear utility, the local thinker selects the safer lottery L when  > 2(1 )=(2 
 2). In the literature, we typically have  > 3=4, so this constraint holds for any   2=3.
Thus, when asked to choose, a local thinker having linear utility and  = 0:7 is risk averse
and prefers L to L$, just as most experimental subjects do.
In contrast, when the local thinker is asked to price the lotteries in isolation, he evaluates
each lottery relative to L0 = (0;1). In this comparison, each lottery's upside is salient. As a
25consequence, since  = 1=2 the local thinker prices the lotteries as:
P(L jL0) = x
2  
+(1 ) ; P(L$ jL0) = x 
=2
=2+(1 =2). (23)
For any  < 1, the local thinker prices L$ higher than L in isolation, i.e.
P(L$ jL0) > P(L jL0).
Both lotteries are priced above their expected value, but L$ is more overpriced than L
because it pays a higher gain with a smaller probability, and from Proposition 1 we know
that lower probabilities are relatively more distorted.18
Thus, while in a choice context the local thinker prefers the safer lottery L, in isolation
he prices the risky lottery L$ higher, exhibiting a preference reversal. Crucially, this behavior
is not due to the fact that choosing and pricing are dierent operations. In fact, in our model
choosing and pricing are the same operation, as in standard economic theory. Preference
reversals occur because, unlike in standard theory, evaluation in our model is context depen-
dent. Pricing and choosing occur in dierent contexts because the alternatives of choice are
dierent in the two cases. One noteworthy feature of our model is that it generates preference
reversals through violations of \procedural invariance", dened by Tversky et al. (1990) as
situations in which a subject prices a lottery above its expected value, P(L1jL0) > E(x1
s),
and yet prefers the expected value to the lottery, L1  (E(x1
s);1). Tversky et al (1990)
show that the vast majority of observed reversals follow from the violations of procedural
invariance, as predicted by our model. Regret Theory can produce preference reversals by a
distinct mechanism, intransitivities in choice, but does not violate procedural invariance.
One distinctive implication of our context-based explanation is that reversals between
choice and pricing should only occur when pricing takes place in isolation but not if agents
price lotteries in the choice context itself. We tested this hypothesis by giving subjects a
choice between lotteries L$ = (16;0:31; 0;0:69) and L = (4;0:97; 0;0:03), which Tversky et
18These predictions are borne out by the literature as well as by our own experimental data. Tversky
et al (1990) show that preference reversals follow from overpricing of L$ in isolation, and that L is not
underpriced. Our model predicts that agents price L close to its expected value because it oers an
extremely high probability of winning, which is hardly distorted.
26al (1990) found to lead to a high rate of preference reversals. Subjects stated their certainty
equivalents for the two lotteries, in isolation and in the context of choice.19 Our model then
predicts that preference reversal should occur between choice and pricing in isolation, but
not between choice and pricing in the choice context.
Despite considerable variation in subjects' evaluations (which is a general feature of such
elicitations, see Grether and Plott (1979), Bostic et al (1990), Tversky et al (1990)), the
results are consistent with our predictions. First, among the subjects who chose L over L$,
the average (avg) price of L in isolation was lower than the average price of L$ in isolation:
avg[P(L jL0)] = 4:6 < avg[P(L$ jL0)] = 5:2 .
Thus, our subjects pool exhibits the standard preference reversal between choice and average
pricing in isolation.20
Second, preference reversals subside when we compare choice and pricing in the choice
context. In fact, in this context the same subjects priced their chosen lottery L higher, on
average, than the alternative risky lottery L$:
avg[P(LjL$)] = 4:3 > avg[P(L$jL)] = 4:1
As predicted by our model, in the choice context the average price ranking is consistent with
choice.21 One may object that this agreement is caused by the subjects' wish to be coherent
19In our experimental design, each subject priced each lottery only once, and dierent lotteries were priced
in dierent contexts. This design ensures that subjects do not deform their prices to be consistent with their
choices; however, it also implies that preference reversals are not observed within-subject but only at the
level of price distributions across subject groups (see Appendix 2 for more details).
20This reversal holds not only with respect to average prices but also for the distribution of prices we
observe. Assuming that subjects draw evaluations randomly from the price distributions, we estimate that
around 54% of the subjects who choose L would exhibit the standard preference reversals (see Appendix
2). The average prices above imply that some subjects priced the safer lottery L above its highest payo.
Such overpricing can occur even in a laboratory setting and with incentives schemes (Grether and Plott
1974, Bostic et al 1990), perhaps due to misunderstanding of the pricing task. In Appendix 2 we consider
truncations of the data that lters out such overpricing.
21In our data, the distribution for P(LjL$) does not dominate that for P(L$jL). This is due to the
fact that: i) on average subjects attribute similar values to both lotteries in the choice context, and ii)
there is substantial variability in choice (and thus in pricing), as about half the subjects chose each lottery.
In Appendix 2 we look in a more detailed way at the manifestation and signicance of fact ii) in light on
Tversky's et al. (1990) analysis of preference reversals.
27when they price just after a choice. However, each subject priced only one of the lotteries
in the choice context.22 It appears to be the act of comparing the lotteries that drives their
evaluation during choice, and not (only) an adjustment of value subsequent to choice.
Another potential objection is that our experiments do not elicit true selling prices. It
is well known that it is dicult to design price elicitation mechanisms for subjects who
violate the independence axiom of Expected Utility Theory. To avoid these problems, Cox
and Epstein (1989) study preference reversals by only eliciting the ranking of selling prices
across lotteries. In their experiments, Cox and Epstein directly compared lotteries to each
other, so their procedure can be viewed as eliciting evaluations in the context of choice. They
nd some evidence of preference reversals, but crucially they show that these reversals are
equally likely in both directions (from risk averse choice to risk seeking pricing, and from risk
seeking choice to risk averse pricing). Symmetric reversal patterns are typically attributed
to arbitrary uctuations in evaluation, see Bostic et al (1990). Thus we interpret Cox
and Epstein's results as consistent with our predictions that systematic preference reversals
subside when prices are elicited in a choice context.
These results suggest that choice and pricing may follow the same fundamental principle
of context-dependent evaluation. Preferences based on choice could dier from those inferred
from pricing in isolation because they represent evaluations made in dierent contexts.
6 Choice Among Many Lotteries, with an Application
to Asset Pricing
6.1 Setup and Denitions
We now extend our model to choice among N  2 of lotteries. Before doing so, note that
salience in a general choice problem cannot be inferred from that of pairwise comparisons,
since salience { and thus evaluation { will generally change for each pairwise comparison.
Pairwise intransitive preferences may even arise in some cases, as we show in Section 7.
22We ran another version of the survey where we asked the subjects to price the lotteries under comparison
but without having to choose between them. These subjects exhibited similar behavior on average, namely
pricing L$ higher than L in isolation, but similarly to L under comparison.
28To model choice from an arbitrary set of alternatives, which is particularly useful for
economic applications, we need to generalize the notion of salience to a general choice set.
Suppose that the local thinker is faced with a state space S and a choice set @ = fL1;:::;LNg
of lotteries dened over S, as in Section 3. Let xs = (x1
s;:::;xN
s ) be the vector of payos
delivered in a generic state s, and denote by x i
s = fxj
sgi6=j the vector of payos excluding xi
s.
The salience of state s for lottery Li is then captured by a function b (xi
s;x i
s ) which contrasts
Li's payo xi
s in s with all other payos x i
s in the same state. Let x i
s + denote the vector
with elements fxj
s + gj6=i. In line with Denition 1, we impose the following properties:
Denition 3 Given a state space S and a choice set @, the salience of state s for lottery Li
is given by a continuous and bounded function b (xi
s;x i
s ) that satises three conditions:
1) Ordering: if xi





































2) Diminishing sensitivity: if xj










3) Reection: for any two states s, e s 2 S such that xj
s;x
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where (:;:) is the salience function employed in the two lottery case of Section 3, and
f(x
 i
s ) : RN 1 ! R is a function of the residual vector x i
s . One intuitive specication











in which case the salience of a state for a lottery depends on the contrast between the lottery's
payo and the average of the other lotteries' payos in s. Even if (:;:) is symmetric, salience
is in general not symmetric in the sense that the same state may have dierent salience for
dierent lotteries. For instance, a state where lottery Li's payo is very dierent from the
payos of all the other Lj's (which in turn are similar to each other) is very salient for Li
but not salient for the Lj's. However, the same state may be very salient for all lotteries,
if for example the lotteries' payos in that state are equally divided into two very dierent
values.
Given a lottery specic salience ranking ki
s based on the salience function b , each state
is assigned a decision weight i
s according to Equation (4), and a value V LT(Li) is computed
for each lottery Li according to Equation (6).
One important new eect arises in our model of choice among N > 2 lotteries. Specif-
ically, the preference ranking among any two lotteries depends not only on the contrast
between their payos but also on the remaining alternatives. The choice set is a source
of context eects. To see how this can arise, consider the pairwise choice between a sure
prospect L1 = (x;1) and a risky lottery L2 = (xh;h; xl;1   h) where xh > x > xl > 0,
h < 1=2 and E(xs) = x. Using the salience function (2) with  = 0, state sl = (x;xl) is
salient when:
xh  xl < x
2. (25)
In this case, which we assume throughout, the lottery's downside is salient and the sure
prospect L1 is chosen from the choice set fL1;L2g.
Suppose now that we add to this choice set another (correlated) risky lottery L3 =
(x + y;h; x   y;1   h) whose payos are spread by an amount y > 0 relative to the sure
prospect L1. Before examining the impact of L3 on the preference between L1 and L2, note
that in a pairwise comparison L1 is always preferred to L3. This is because by diminishing
sensitivity the spread y is more salient as a loss than as a gain.
30Consider now the agent's choice from the enlarged choice set fL1;L2;L3g. If the axiom of
independence of irrelevant alternatives holds, the agent's preference of L1 over L2 should not
be aected by the presence of L3. In our model, however, this does not need to be so. To
see this, note that when evaluating L2 in the enlarged choice set, the salience of the state sh
is now computed by contrasting the lottery's payo xh with the average payo x+y=2 of L1
and L3 in the same state sh, while the salience of the state sl in which L2 loses now contrasts
the lottery's payo xl with x   y=2. Consider the most interesting case where lottery L2 is
still risky relative to the average lottery in the choice set, in the sense that xh > x+y=2 and
xl < x   y=2. It is then easy to show that the loss state sl remains salient for L2 provided:





Thus, in the range xhxl 2 (x2   y2=4;x2) the local thinker prefers L1 to L2 in a pairwise
comparison but prefers L2 to L1 when L3 is added to the choice set. Intuitively, when L3
is added, the downside xl of the original risky lottery L2 looks less bad, relative to the
alternatives. Although L2's upside xh also looks less good, by the convexity property the
former eect is stronger. In other words, the inclusion of an \unfavourable" risky lottery
L3 boosts the risk tolerance of the agent by making the risky lottery L2 look better by
comparison. This can induce the agent to switch his choice to L2 over L1. The general
analysis of these so-called \decoy" eects is beyond the scope of this paper, and can be
found in Bordalo (2011). An interesting implication of the model is that such shifts in
salience (and resulting violations of the axiom of independence of irrelevant alternatives)
should subside when the choice set is large (i.e. N is large).
Such choice set eects imply that manifestly dominated lotteries may aect salience and
thus evaluation. As shown in Bordalo (2011), one can even construct ne-tuned examples in
which a dominated lottery is overvalued relatively to, and even chosen over, a dominating
lottery. In reality, however, the agent quickly realizes that the dominating option is more
valuable: what is salient then is the dominance relation between lotteries. To deal with this
feature while keeping the model tractable, we have assumed in Section 3.2 that the agent
edits the choice set by immediately identifying, and discarding, dominated lotteries. (This
31is reminiscent of the editing out of dominated lotteries in Prospect Theory.)
6.2 An application of salience to asset pricing
In this subsection, we show how our model of salience can be included in a very standard
asset pricing model in a way that accounts for some puzzling existing evidence. An investor
living for two periods t = 0;1 decides at t = 0 how to allocate his wealth w between current
and future consumption by investing in a measure 1 of assets, each available in net supply
of 1. The investor values consumption according to a concave utility function u(c) (u0 > 0;
u00  0) and there is no time discounting. Each unit of asset i 2 [0;1] costs pi units of current
consumption and yields at t = 1 a dividend xi




the aggregate payo of all assets in s 2 S. In line with Equation (24), we dene the salience
of a state s for a generic asset i as a function of the asset's payo xi
s in that state and the




where (:;:) satises Denition 1. Since each asset captures an innitesimal market share,
all assets are compared to the same market benchmark xs. Equation (27) implies that a
state is salient for an asset if in that state the asset's payo \stands out" relative to the
market payo. We then adopt the following denition:
Denition 4 At prices (pi)i2[0;1] an equilibrium portfolio for a local thinker consists of a
measure one of asset holdings (i)i2[0;1] such that:
1) The portfolio (i)i2[0;1] is feasible, namely
R
i i  pi  di  w, and
2) The portfolio (i)i2[0;1] is preferred to any portfolio obtained from it by a small deviation
along the holding j of asset j, for any j 2 [0;1]. The deviation for each asset j is evaluated
in light of that asset's salience weighting.
Denition 4 extends the standard theory of portfolio choice to the case of a local thinker.
Just as in our prior analysis the local thinker evaluated the expected gain (relative to the
status quo) of accepting a lottery in light of the lottery's salient states, condition 2) states
32that when deciding of whether to buy an extra unit of an asset the investor evaluates the
incremental gain so obtained in light of that asset's salience ranking. Additionally, just as
the salience of a lottery is shaped by the choice set, according to Equation (27) the salience
of an asset is determined by its comparison with the other assets in the market (and not with
the investor's status quo portfolio). The market is the key source of context dependence in
our specication.
To see what Denition 4 implies for the investor's optimal choice, consider a specic asset
j 2 [0;1] and let (0
i)i2[0;1] be a portfolio which coincides with (i)i2[0;1] along the holdings of
every asset i 6= j, but is not constrained in its holding of asset j. By condition 2), (i)i2[0;1]
is an equilibrium portfolio provided:

























; for all j 2 [0;1].
(28)
This is the standard utility maximization condition except for the fact that a deviation along
the holding of each asset j is evaluated using the asset-specic decision weights !s;j. From











, for all i 2 [0;1], (29)
where c0 = w  
R
ipi and c1;s =
R
i  xi
s are the consumption levels at each time and in
each state. When deciding whether to buy an extra unit of asset i, the investor realizes
that the cost of doing so is the utility value of the consumption pi forsaken at t = 0, while
the expected benet is the utility value of earning xi
s in each future state s. Equation (29)
departs from the standard Euler equation because the benet xi
s of the asset is weighted by
its salience !i
s. When thinking about an asset, the investor is drawn to over-value its salient
payos and under-value its non-salient payos. The investor will then seek to buy a higher
quantity of an asset whose upside is salient, especially if such upside occurs in a state where
the marginal utility of consumption u0(c1;s) is high.
Consider the implications of this model for asset prices. In general equilibrium, the
investor must hold the market portfolio, namely i = 1 for all i, c1;s = xs for all s, and
33c0 = w  
R
i pi  di > 0. Suppose that at t = 1 there is no aggregate risk so that the average
payo is xs = x for all s (and thus c1;s = c1 = x for all s). Then, for any utility function










, for all i 2 [0;1], (30)
where R = u0(c0)=u0(c1) is the return on the riskless asset. The rst term on the right hand
side of (30) is the price prevailing when the agent is fully rational (i.e. when  = 1): in the
absence of aggregate risk, the investor is risk neutral at the margin, valuing each asset at
its expected discounted dividend. Indeed, for a diversied investor, standard risk aversion is
second order, leaving prices unaected.
Relative to an Expected Utility maximizer, the local thinker over or under values an
asset by the second term on the right hand side, which increases in the covariance between
the asset's payos and their salience. Specically, the local thinker overvalues an asset
{ exhibiting risk seeking behavior { when the asset's highest payos are salient, while he
undervalues an asset, exhibiting risk averse behavior, when the asset's lowest payos are
salient. By shaping the agent's focus on specic asset payos, salience creates a rst order
source of risk attitudes.
To illustrate how this mechanism works, consider the well-known empirical nding in
the cross-section of stock returns, namely the fact that value stocks { those with low stock
market values relative to measures of \fundamentals" such as assets or earnings { earn higher
average returns than growth stocks, those with high market values relative to measures of
fundamentals (Fama and French, 1993, Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). Consider






xg s 2 Sg






xv s 2 Sv
l s 2 S=Sv
where xg > xv > x > l (where x is the average market payo) and Pr(s 2 Sg) = g <
Pr(s 2 Sv) = v. Asset g is a \growth stock", delivering a large above market payo xg with
34small probability g and a below market payo l with a high probability 1 g. Asset v is a
\value stock", yielding a small above market payo xv with high probability v and a below
market payo l with low probability 1 v. Suppose now that the salience of dierent states
satises:
(x
g;x) > (l;x) > (x
v;x). (31)
That is, the upside of the growth stock stands out relative to the market, while for the value
stock the downside stands out. Using the salience function of Equation (2), this condition
is met when xgl > x2 > xvl, which requires the upside xv of the more stable value stock to
be suciently close to the market average x relative to the upside xg of the growth stock.
In this case, the investor thinks of the growth stock as an opportunity to obtain a large
windfall while he magnies the downside risk of the value stock. This agent (partly) neglects
the fact that the growth stock has an objectively higher probability of a low payo because
its upside xg is suciently salient to catch the agent's attention. Equation (30) then yields
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v(1   v)(1   )
R
 (x
v   l). (33)
The growth stock is over-valued and the value stock is under-valued, the more so the lower
is .
This implication of the model is consistent with the empirical evidence we already men-
tioned, but it goes further than that. Fama and French (1992,1993) have conjectured that
the reason that value stocks earn higher average returns is that they are disproportionately
exposed to a separate risk factor, which they referred to as distress risk. Subsequent re-
search, however, has not been able to nd evidence that value stocks are particularly risky
(Lakonishok et al, 1994). Furthermore, Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi (2008) nd that
stocks of companies vulnerable to the risk of bankruptcy earn if anything lower average re-
turns, contradicting the Fama-French view that \value" reects bankruptcy risk. Our model
of salience might help explain what is going on. It suggests that while value stocks are not
35fundamentally riskier, the possibility of their bankruptcy (or a very low payo) is salient
to the investors, and as a consequence value stocks are underpriced. The model thus puts
together the Fama-French idea that investors fear bankruptcy of value stocks with the em-
pirical observation that this possibility is salient and thus exaggerated, so value stocks are
indeed underpriced.
More generally, this example shows that the extent to which certain asset payos \stand
out" relative to the market may cause { through salience { distortions in the perception of
asset specic risks and thus of asset prices, for instance helping to explain why right-skewed
assets tend to be overvalued. This principle may also imply that, precisely by reducing
right-skewness, a diversied basket of stocks could also be relatively undervalued. We leave
further analysis of the impact of salience on asset prices to future work.
7 Other applications and extensions
7.1 Reection and Framing Eects
KT (1979) show that experimental subjects shift from risk aversion to risk seeking as gains
are reected into losses. Our model yields these shifts in risk attitudes solely based on the
salience of payos, without relying on the S-shaped value function of Prospect Theory. To
see this, consider the choice between lottery L1 = (x1
s;s)s2S and sure prospect L2 = (x;1),
both of which are dened over gains (i.e. x1
s;x > 0) and have the same expected value
E(x1
















Thus, the local thinker is risk averse, choosing L2 over L1, when cov[!1
s;x1
s] < 0. If then
L1 and L2 are reected into lotteries L0
1 = ( x1
s;s)s2S and L0
2 = ( x;1), property 3) in
Denition 1 implies that the salience ranking among states does not change. As a result,




















36which is fullled if and only if the agent was originally risk averse. Intuitively, a salient
downside inducing risk aversion in the gain domain becomes a salient upside inducing risk
seeking in the loss domain. Our model thus yields the fourfold pattern of risk preferences23
without assuming, as Prospect Theory does, a value function that is concave for gains and
convex for losses. Reection of payos generates shifts in risk attitudes by inducing the
agent to shift his attention from the lottery upside to its downside and vice versa. The same
logic shows our model can account for the KT's (1981) famous framing experiments and the
Public Health Dilemma, even with a linear value function.
7.2 Intransitivity of pairwise preferences
Intransitivities may arise in our model, but their occurrence rests on a delicate balance
between probabilities, payos and degree of local thinking . In certain classes of cases,
such a balance does not exists. For example, intransitivities never occur in choices among
independent lotteries sharing the same support with fewer than 4 outcomes. To illustrate












0; 1   
; Ls = (y;1); (36)
where x;y > 0 and  < 1. Lotteries L$ and L are of the kind giving rise to the preference
reversals of Section 5. In this case, a local thinker prefers the safer lottery L to L$ as long
as  is large and  is not too small. Suppose now that the sure prospect y is such that in
the pairwise comparison with L$ the latter's gain is salient while in that with L the latter's
loss is salient, i.e. (x;y) > (0;y) > (x;y). It is then possible to nd values (y;) such
that choices are intransitive:24
L  L$; L$  Ls; Ls  L:
23The four-fold pattern of risk preferences refers to risk seeking behavior for gambles with small probabil-
ities of gains and gambles with moderate or large probabilities of losses, and risk averse behavior when the
signs of payos are reversed, see Tversky et al (1990).
24One numerical example is x = 100; = 1=10; = 3=4;y = 4 and  = 0:75.
37Intransitivity arises because risk aversion in the direct comparison of L with L$ is reversed
to risk seeking when the two lotteries are indirectly compared via their pairwise choice against
the sure thing Ls. The intuition is as follows. In the direct comparison, L  L$ because
lottery L pays o with much higher probability than L$. In the indirect comparison,
L  L$ because the sure thing stresses the upside of the risky lottery and the downside
of the safe lottery. This is \as if" in the direct comparison the agent chooses based on
probabilities, while in the indirect comparison he chooses based on payos. This intuition is
closely related to Tversky's (1969) account of intransitivities in choice under risk.
7.3 Mixed Lotteries
We now apply our model to mixed lotteries, those involving both positive and negative
payos. To this end, we come back to the KT (1979) piecewise linear value function exhibiting
loss aversion, for loss aversion provides an intuitive explanation for risk aversion with respect
to small mixed bets. Using the salience function of Equation (2), for which (x;y) =
( x; y) for all x;y, all risk aversion for lotteries symmetric around zero is due to loss
aversion. For non-symmetric lotteries, salience and loss aversion interact to determine risk







; L0 = ($0; 1) .
In this choice, many subjects decline LS even though it has a positive and substantial
expected value. With a symmetric salience function, we have that (200;0) > (100;0) =
( 100;0), implying that in this choice the local thinker focuses on the lottery gain.





x; if x > 0
x; if x < 0
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The agent rejects LS when his dislike for losses more than compensates for his focus on
the lottery gain, i.e.  > 2=.25 In lotteries where the negative downside is larger than the
positive upside, salience and loss aversion go in the same direction in triggering risk aversion.
Although our approach can be easily integrated with standard loss aversion, we wish to
stress that salience may itself provide one interpretation of the idea that \losses loom larger
than gains" (KT 1979) where, independently of loss aversion in the value function, states
with negative payos are ceteris paribus more salient than states with positive payos. The
ranking of positive and negative states is in fact left unspecied by Denition 1. One could
therefore add an additional property:
4) Loss salience: for every state s with payos xs = (xi
s)i=1;2 such that x1
s + x2











This condition relaxes the symmetry around zero of the salience function of Equation (2)
represented in Figure 1, postulating that departures from zero are more salient in the negative
than in the positive direction. In this specication, local thinking can itself be a force towards
risk aversion for mixed lotteries, complementing loss aversion. In particular, if losses are
suciently more salient than gains, one can account for Samuelson's wager based on salience
alone (and linear utility): if ( 100;0) > (200;0), a local thinker with linear utility rejects
Samuelson's bet as long as 200  
1+   100  1
1+ < 0, or  < 1=2. A specication where
risk aversion for mixed lotteries arises via the salience of lottery payos may give distinctive
implications from standard loss aversion, but we do not investigate this possibility here.26
25The role of loss aversion can also be gauged by considering the choice between two symmetric lotteries
with zero expected value, L1 = ( x;0:5; x;0:5) and L2 = ( y;0:5; y;0:5), with x > y. Since (2) is
symmetric, the states ( x;y) and (x; y) have salience rank 1, whereas states ( x; y) and (x;y) have
salience rank 2, so that L1 is evaluated at x(1   )=2, and L1 is evaluated at y(1   )=2. This implies that
for any degree of loss aversion  > 1, the Local Thinker prefers the safer lottery L2.
26If we endow the local thinker with a standard utility function, instead of a value function, then in the
absence of property 5) the utility function would be subject to Rabin's critique (Rabin, 2000) in the domain
398 Conclusion
Our paper explores how cognitive limitations cause people to focus their attention on some
but not all aspects of the world, the phenomenon we call local thinking. We argue that
salience, a concept well-known to cognitive psychology, shapes this focus. In the case of
choice under risk, this perspective can be implemented in a straightforward and parsimonious
way by specifying that contrast between payos shapes their salience, and that people inate
the decision weights associated with salient payos. Basically, decision makers overweight
the upside of a risky choice when it is salient and thus behave in a risk-seeking way, and
overweigh the downside when it is salient, and behave in a risk averse way. This approach
provides an intuitive and unied explanation of the instability of risk preferences, including
the dramatic switches from risk seeking to risk averse behavior resulting from seemingly
innocuous changes in the problem, as well as of some fundamental puzzles in choice under
risk such as the Allais paradox and preference reversals. It makes predictions for when these
paradoxes will and will not occur, which we test and conrm experimentally.
Other aspects of salience have been used by economists to examine the consequences
of people reacting to some pieces of data (salient ones) more strongly than to others. For
example, Chetty et al. (2009) show that shoppers are more responsive to sales taxes already
included in posted prices than to sales taxes added at the register. Barber and Odean (2008)
nd that stock traders respond to \attention grabbing" news. Perhaps most profoundly,
Schelling (1960) has shown that people can solve coordination problems by focusing on salient
equilibria based on their general knowledge, without any possibility for communication.
Memory becomes a potential source of salient data. Our formal approach is consistent with
this work, and stresses that in the specic context of choice under risk the relative magnitude
of payos is itself a critical determinant of salience.
Our specication of contrast as a driver of salience could be useful for thinking about
a variety of economic situations. We have discussed an application to asset pricing and
the growth/value anomaly, but other misperceptions in nance might also be inuenced by
of mixed lotteries (but not in the domain of positive lotteries). Adding property 5) would entail that aversion
to mixed lotteries with positive payos follows from salience, and not from underlying preferences. Thus,
even though such a local thinker is at heart an expected utility maximizer, he is immune to Rabin's critique.
40salience. Salience may also aect consumer behavior: when considering which of dierent
brands to buy, a consumer might focus on the attributes where the potential brands are
most dierent, neglecting the others (see Tversky and Simonson 1993). Bordalo (2011) and
Koszegi and Szeidl (2011) use a version of our model of salience to investigate this issue. In
many applications, the key idea of our approach is that mental frames, rather than being
xed in the mind of the consumer, investor, or voter, are endogenous to the contrasting
features of the alternatives of choice. This notion could perhaps provide a way to study how
context shapes preferences in many social domains.
41Appendix 1.
Proposition 1 If the probability of state s is increased by ds = hs and the probabilities
of other states are reduced while keeping their odds constant, i.e. de s =   s
1 she s for all


































Replacing ds = hs and dr =   s
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